We introduce a uniform approach of representing a variety of paraconsistent nonmonotonic formalisms by quantified Boolean formulae (QBFs) in the context of multiple-valued logics. We show that this framework provides a useful platform for capturing, in a simple and natural way, a wide range of methods for preferential reasoning. The outcome is a subtle approach to represent the underlying formalisms, which induces a straightforward way to compute the corresponding entailments: By incorporating off-the-shelf QBF solvers it is possible to simulate within our framework various kinds of preferential formalisms, among which are Priest's logic LPm of reasoning with minimal inconsistency, Batens' adaptive logic ACLuNs2, Besnard and Schaub's inference relation |= n , a variety of formula-preferential systems, some bilattice-based preferential relations (e.g., |= I 1 and |= I 2 ), and consequence relations for reasoning with graded uncertainty, such as the four-valued logic |= 4 c .
INTRODUCTION
Preferential reasoning was introduced by McCarthy [1980] and later by Shoham [1988 Shoham [ , 1987 as a generalization of the notion of circumscription. This is a common method behind many general patterns of nonmonotonic
reasoning [Kraus et al. 1990 ; Lehmann and Magidor 1992; Makinson 1994] , and is often used as a technique for defining consequence relations that are paraconsistent [da Costa 1974] , that is, formalisms in which inconsistent sets of premises do not entail any well-formed formula whatsoever (see, e.g., Arieli [2003] , Arieli and Avron [1998] , Avron and Lev [2001] , Batens [2000] , Besnard and Schaub [1996] , Carnielli and Marcos [2002] , Kifer and Lozinskii [1992] , Konieczny and Marquis [2002] , Priest [1991] , and Schlechta [2000] ). The essential idea behind preferential reasoning is that only a "preferred" subset of models of a given theory should be taken into consideration for making inferences from that theory. The relevant models are determined by pre-defined conditions, the satisfaction of which yields the exact kind of preference one wants to work with.
In this article we introduce a uniform setting for representing a variety of preferential paraconsistent consequence relations. This setting is nonclassical in nature, since in the context of classical logic, preferential semantics cannot help to overcome the problem of trivial reasoning with contradictory theories (indeed, if a certain theory has no two-valued models, then it has no preferred models as well). A useful way of reasoning with contradictory classical theories is therefore by embedding them in multiple-valued logics in general, and Belnap's four-valued logic [1977a Belnap's four-valued logic [ , 1977b in particular. The latter is particularly useful for reasoning with uncertainty (see, e.g., Arieli and Avron [1998] ) and serves as the underlying multiple-valued semantics in our case as well.
At the computational level, however, implementing paraconsistent reasoning based on four-valued semantics poses important challenges. An effective implementation of theorem provers for one of the existing proof systems for Belnap's logic requires a major effort. In order to handle this problem and provide an efficient way of simulating paraconsistent preferential entailments, we consider the following two-phased approach:
(1) Encoding of the underlying multivalued logic in terms of classical logic. For this, we use signed theories, apparently first introduced by Schaub [1998, 1996] as syntax-independent paraconsistent reasoning systems. These theories are obtained by polynomial-time transformations on the original theories, which implies that preferential four-valued semantics can be effectively implemented by standard theorem proving in two-valued logic (see also Arieli and Denecker [2003] ). (2) Representing preferences among the models of the theory by quantified Boolean formulae (QBFs) . 1 The use of quantified propositional logic for knowledge representation and reasoning was first proposed by Egly et al. [2000] and then by Besnard et al. [2004 Besnard et al. [ , 2003 Besnard et al. [ , 2002 , who considered the encoding of different forms of nonmonotonic and paraconsistent reasoning by means of QBFs. One important rationale of the QBF approach is that existing solvers can be readily used as back-end tools for implementing the reasoning task at hand.
The outcome of our approach is a general represention platform that yields an easy and natural way to handle computational aspects of the underlying consequence relations; by incorporating off-the-shelf computational models for processing QBFs, such as QuBE [Giunchiglia et al. 2001] , SEMPROP [Letz 2002 ], and DECIDE [Rintanen 1999 ], 2 it is possible to simulate a variety of nonmonotonic and paraconsistent formalisms such as Priest's LPm [1991 , Besnard and Schaub's inference relation |= n [Besnard and Schaub 1997] , various kinds of bilattice-based pointwise-preferential relations Avron 1998, 1996] and formula-preferential relations [Avron and Lev 2001] , consequence relations for reasoning with graded uncertainty (such as the four-valued logics |= 4 c ; see Arieli [2003] ), and some adaptive logics (e.g., Batens' ACLuNs2 [2000 , 1998 ). The main contribution of this article is, therefore, that it provides a simple, yet general way of representing and reasoning with a variety of manyvalued paraconsistent logics (including those simulated in Arieli and Denecker [2003] and Besnard et al. [2003] ).
The rest of this article is organized as follows: In the next two sections we set-up our framework. These sections describe, in particular, how to reason with signed formulae in the context of four-valued semantics. Then we show how this framework may be used for simulating paraconsistent nonmonotonic reasoning in the context of two-valued semantics: Section 4 shows how signed formulae may be used in order to simulate a variety of basic (monotonic) consequence relations, and Section 5 shows how preferential derivatives of these consequence relations may be simulated within our framework by incorporating QBFs. In Section 6 we consider some possible extensions of our setting and show how the basic definitions can be generalized accordingly. Finally, in Section 7 we consider some related works and in Section 8 we conclude. 3 
FOUR-VALUED SEMANTICS
The formalism that we consider here is based on four-valued semantics and a corresponding four-valued algebraic structure (denoted by FOUR), introduced by Belnap [1977a Belnap [ , 1977b . This structure is composed of four elements FOUR = {t, f , ⊥, }, arranged in two lattice structures: one is the standard logical partial order ≤ t which intuitively reflects differences in the "measure of truth" that every value represents. According to this order, f is the minimal element, t maximal, and the other two elements ⊥ (intuitively representing partial information) and (intuitively representing contradictory information) are intermediate values that are incomparable. ({t, f , , ⊥}, ≤ t ) is a distributive lattice with an order reversing involution ¬ for which ¬ = and ¬⊥=⊥. We shall denote the meet and join of this lattice by ∧ and ∨, respectively.
The other partial order ≤ k is understood (again, intuitively) as reflecting differences in the amount of knowledge or information that each truth value exhibits. Again, ({t, f , , ⊥}, ≤ k ) is a lattice in which ⊥ is the minimal element, the maximal element, and t, f are incomparable.
• O. Arieli The elements of FOUR can be represented by pairs of two-valued components of the lattice ({0, 1}, 0 < 1) as follows: t = (1, 0), f = (0, 1), = (1, 1), ⊥ =(0, 0). One way to intuitively understand this representation is that a truth value (x, y) of p corresponds to the amount x of belief in p and the amount y of disbelief in p. The following lemma expresses the partial orders and basic operators of FOUR in terms of this representation by pairs (see also Figure 1 ). LEMMA 2.1 [GINSBERG 1988] . Let x, y, x i , y i ∈ {0, 1} (i = 1, 2). Then:
The next step in using FOUR for reasoning is to choose its set of designated elements. The obvious choice is D = {t, }, since both values intuitively represent formulae known to be true. The set D has the property that a ∧b ∈ D iff both a and b are in D, while a∨b ∈ D iff at least one of a or b is in D, and so D is a prime filter in FOUR. Note also that D = {(1, x) | x ∈ {0, 1}}.
From this point on, the various semantic and syntactic notions are defined on FOUR as natural generalizations of similar classical notions: -The underlying propositional language consists of an alphabet of propositional variables, propositional constants t and f, and logical symbols ¬, ∧, ∨. We denote elements in by p, q, r, formulae by ψ, φ, and sets of formulae by T , T i . The set of all atoms occurring in ψ is denoted by A(ψ). Similarly, A(T ) denotes the union of all the sets A(ψ) such that ψ ∈ T . -A valuation ν is a function that assigns a truth value from FOUR to each atomic formula, and ν(t) = t, ν(f) = f . Any valuation is extended to complex formulae in the obvious way:
We will sometimes write ψ : b∈ ν instead of ν(ψ) = b.
A valuation that satisfies every formula in T is a model of T . The set of models of T is denoted by mod(T ).
Note that in the four-valued context there are no tautologies in the propositional language defined previously. Thus, for example, excluded middle is not valid, as ν( p ∨ ¬p) = ⊥ when ν( p) = ⊥. This implies that the definition of the material implication ψ → φ as ¬ψ ∨ φ is not adequate for representing entailments. Instead, we use here the following connective (see also Avron [1998, 1996] and Besnard et al. [2003] and Footnote 5 to follow for further justifications and other applications of this definition).
Note that a ⊃ b = a → b when a, b ∈ {t, f }, and so the preceding implication is a generalization of the material implication. Like the other binary connectives, we define ν(ψ ⊃ φ) = ν(ψ) ⊃ ν(φ). The propositional language extended with ⊃ is denoted by L. As shown in Arieli and Avron [1998] , L is functionally complete for FOUR.
PROOF. If x 1 = 1, then (x 1 , y 1 ) ∈ D, and so (x 1 , y 1 ) ⊃ (x 2 , y 2 ) = (x 2 , y 2 ). If x 1 = 0, then (x 1 , y 1 ) ∈ D, and so (x 1 , y 1 ) ⊃ (x 2 , y 2 ) = (1, 0). Both of cases are represented by the equation that is specified in the lemma.
SIGNED FORMULAE
It is obvious that the representation of truth values in terms of pairs of two-valued components, considered in the previous section, implies a similar way of representing four-valued valuations; a four-valued valuation ν may be represented in terms of a pair of two-valued components (ν 1 , ν 2 ) by 
In what follows we denote by ν 2 a valuation into {0, 1}, and by ν 4 a valuation into {t, f , , ⊥}.
Definition 3.2. For p ∈ and ψ, φ ∈ L, define the following formulae in L ± :
Example 3.3. Consider the formula ψ = ¬( p ∨ ¬q) ∨ ¬q. Then,
We call τ i (ψ) (i = 1, 2) the signed formulae that are obtained from ψ. Intuitively, τ 1 (ψ) indicates whether ψ should be "at least true" (i.e., it is assigned t or ), and τ 2 (ψ) indicates whether ψ is "at least false". In other words, if τ 1 (ψ) (respectively, τ 2 (ψ)) is true in the two-valued context, then ψ (respectively, ¬ψ) holds in the four-valued context (compare with Corollaries 3.5 and 3.6).
The proof of part (2) is similar; we show here only the base step. Indeed, for atom p,
The last corollary may be reformulated as follows. The fact that a formula ψ should have a truth value x may thus be encoded by a signed formula val(ψ, x) as follows. 
PROOF. This is another immediate consequence of Proposition 3.4. Consider, for example,
The proof of the other cases is similar.
The last results may be specified in terms of models of a given theory as follows.
PROPOSITION 3.9. Let T be a set of formulae in L.
(1) The (two-valued) 
PROOF. A valuation ν
4 is a model of T iff for every ψ ∈ T ν 4 (ψ) ∈ {t, }, iff for every ψ ∈ T ν 4 (ψ) ≥ k t, iff (Corollary 3.5) for every ψ ∈ T ν 2 (τ 1 (ψ)) = 1, iff ν 2 is a model of τ 1 (T ). Similarly, by Proposition 3.8, ν 4 is a model of T iff for
. These arguments easily imply both parts of the proposition.
USING SIGNED FORMULAE TO SIMULATE BASIC ENTAILMENTS
In the next two sections we show how the signed theories introduced previously can be used to simulate paraconsistent reasoning by classical entailments. In this section we show how basic four-valued and three-valued consequence relations can be defined in terms of a classical two-valued entailment of signed theories, and in Section 5 we show that three-valued and four-valued preferential relations can be defined in terms of a classical entailment for the signed theories, augmented with quantified Boolean axioms.
In what follows we denote by |= 2 the two-valued classical consequence relation and by |= 4 the four-valued counterpart, that is, T |= 4 ψ if every four-valued model of T is a four-valued model of ψ. By Proposition 3.9 we immediately have the following theorem.
The preceding theorem implies, in particular, that one can simulate fourvalued entailment by two-valued entailment. It follows, therefore, that fourvalued reasoning may be implemented by two-valued theorem provers or SAT solvers. Moreover, as τ 1 (T ) is obtained from T in polynomial time, Theorem 4.1 shows that four-valued entailment in the context of Belnap's logic is polynomially reducible to classical entailment.
In this case, for example, τ 1 (T 1 ) |= 2 r + and τ 1 (T 1 ) |= 2 s + , so indeed T 1 |= 4 r and T 1 |= 4 s (consider, e.g., a valuation that assigns to p and q, and f to r and s). Note also that this example shows that |= 4 is a paraconsistent consequence relation, since (unlike classical logic), it is not the case that every formula is a |= 4 -consequence of a classically inconsistent theory. It is interesting to note that if the connective ⊃ does not appear in T , then τ 1 (T ) (as well as D(T )) is a positive theory (i.e., a theory without negations). In particular then, Theorem 4.1 also implies the following well-known result. 4 See also Arieli and Denecker [2003] for a similar result (for the language without "⊃"), obtained by a different transformation. 5 Note that T 2 is obtained from T 1 by using ⊃ instead of the material implication →, so this example demonstrates the fact that in the four-valued setting, Modus Ponens and the Deduction theorem are satisfied by ⊃ but not by →. This is another vindication to the claim that in the four-valued setting the former connective is more suitable for representing entailment than the latter.
PROOF. The proof follows from Theorem 4.1 and the fact that in the positive propositional language, τ 1 (T ) is the same as T (using ± instead of ).
Theorem 4.1 also shows that some basic three-valued logics can be simulated in our framework.
COROLLARY 4.5. Let T be a set of formulae in L and ψ a formula in L.
-Denote by |= 3 LP the entailment relation of Priest's three-valued logic LP [Priest 1991 [Priest , 1989 . Then
Kl the entailment relation of Kleene's three-valued logic [Kleene 1950 ]. Then
PROOF. By Theorem 4.1 and the facts that T |= Arieli and Avron [1998] ).
USING SIGNED QBFS TO SIMULATE PREFERENTIAL ENTAILMENTS

Preferential Reasoning
Consider again the theory
Intuitively, since the information about r is related to inconsistent (thus unreliable) information about p, we have that T 1 |= 4 r. However, the fact that T 1 |= 4 s seems more controversial in this case, since the information about q and s is not related to the cause of inconsistency in T 1 , and so applying classically valid rules such as the disjunctive syllogism to {q, ¬q ∨ s} for concluding s from T 1 should be justified here. In terms of Batens [1998 Batens [ , 1989 , then, |= 4 is not adaptive, since it does not presuppose the consistency of all the assertions "unless and until proven otherwise." In other words, although it is possible to distinguish between a consistent fragment and an inconsistent fragment of T 1 , it is not the case that assertions that classically follow from the consistent and are not related to the inconsistent fragment are |= 4 -consequences of T 1 . Note further that s is not even a |= 4 -consequence of the classically consistent subtheory {q, ¬q ∨ s}, and so |= 4 is strictly weaker than classical logic (see also Avron [1998, 1996] ). It is well-known that Priest's |= 3 LP (see Corollary 4.5) has the same drawback.
One way to overcome these shortcomings is to refine the underlying consequence relations, and rather than taking into account all models of the premises, to consider only a subset of preferential models [McCarthy 1980; Shoham 1988 ,
1987] as relevant for making inferences. These models are determined according to some preference conditions that can be specified syntactically by a set of (usually second-order) propositions, or by order relations on the space of valuations (see, e.g., Makinson [1994] for a detailed discussion on preferential reasoning). We now introduce a general setting for such order relations.
Definition 5.1. Let ν 1 and ν 2 be two valuations, ϒ ⊆ FOUR, and be a set of formulae in L. ν 1 is ϒ-preferred to ν 2 with respect to (denoted
We denote by ν 1 < ϒ ν 2 that ν 1 ≤ ϒ ν 2 and ν 2 ≤ ϒ ν 1 .
Intuitively, represents the "abnormal formulae" (see Batens [1998] ) and the purpose is to minimize the ϒ-assignments of the elements in . In this respect, Definitions 5.1 and 5.2 may be viewed as a generalization of preferential orders considered elsewhere in the literature: When ϒ consists of the designated elements, the order relations of Definition 5.1 are called formula-preferential orders [Avron and Lev 2001] . When ⊆ , these kinds of orders are called pointwise-preferential [Arieli and Avron 1998; Avron and Lev 2001] , and their minimal elements are the valuations with minimal sets of atoms 8 that are assigned values in ϒ. In the latter case, ϒ sometimes consists of "abnormal values" (e.g., or ⊥) that should be assigned to as minimal number of atoms as possible. Note also that in the particular case where = T (respectively, where = A(T )), the purpose is to minimize the ϒ-assignments of the (atomic) formulae that appear in (some formulae of) the premises.
Example 5.3. Consider again the set T 1 = {p, ¬ p, q, ¬ p ∨ r, ¬q ∨ s} of Example 4.2. The 24 four-valued models of T 1 are listed in Table I .
Anomalous situations such as the ones represented by ν 21 and ν 23 (see Table I ) are the reason that consequence relations like |= 4 are "over-cautious", and causing counterintuitive conclusions, such as T 1 |= 4 s, discussed at the beginning of this section. Preferential reasoning avoids these anomalies by taking into account only the most "plausible" models of the premises. In this case, for instance, one could take ϒ = { , ⊥} as the set of "abnormal" values (the assignments of which should be minimized), or = {u∧¬u | u ∈ } as a set of abnormal formulae. With these choices and in the notations of Table I , the ≤ A(T 1 ) ϒ -minimal models of T 1 are ν 2 = {p : , q : t, r : t, s : t} and ν 3 = {p : , q : t, r : f , s : t}. These are also the ≤ ϒ -minimal models of T 1 , but only ν 2 is a ≤
Example 5.3 (Continued). In the notations of Example 5.3,
It follows that the preferential relations considered here are indeed adaptive, and although T 1 |= 4 s, in all of them s is deducible from T 1 .
Again, Definition 5.4 includes a variety of preferential consequence relations, many of which correspond to particular cases that were introduced elsewhere. Before considering ways to properly represent these consequence relations and showing how this affects the computational feasibility of the corresponding reasoning process, we list some specific (already investigated) relations among those of Definition 5.4. [Priest 1991 [Priest , 1989 . 9 Then
10 then with the same , we have
ψ The same pointwise consequence relations also simulate Batens' adaptive logic ACLuNs2 [Batens 1998 ]. (2) Arieli and Avron's pointwise-preferential consequence relation for reasoning with minimal inconsistency |= 4 I 1 Avron 1998, 1996] can be represented by the following pointwise consequence relation: Priest [1991 Priest [ , 1989 ] the language without "⊃" is considered, but the results here hold for the extended language as well. 10 In other words, the same definition, but only with respect to {t, f , }.
•
O. Arieli
Similarly, the consequence relation |= 4 I 2 for reasoning with most classical models, introduced in the same papers, can be represented as follows:
Besnard and Schaub's three-valued formula-preferential consequence relation |= n [Besnard and Schaub 1997] is represented by the following formulapreferential relations:
(4) Given a set of formulae, denote by |= P Avron and Lev's -preferential consequence relation that is based on the deterministic four-valued preferential system P = (|= 4 , ≤ { ,t} ) [Avron and Lev 2001] . 11 The intuition here is, again, to consider models of the premises that satisfy a minimal amount of abnormal formulae (in ). In our context then, ϒ is the set D = { , t} of the designated elements in FOUR, and so
Other preferential logics, such as Arieli and Avron's consequence relation |= 4 k for preferring minimal knowledge Avron 1998, 1996] are also representable by the consequence relations of Definition 5.4, using extended languages; see Avron and Lev [2001] for the details.
QBFs and Signed QBFs
In the following sections we show how the consequence relations that are obtained from Definition 5.4 can be simulated by signed formulae and classical entailment. In order to extend the technique of Section 4 (and the result of Theorem 4.1) to preferential four-valued reasoning, we should express that a given interpretation is minimal with respect to the underlying preference relation, that is, to represent the minimization conditions of Definition 5.2. This is accomplished by introducing (signed) quantified Boolean formulae (QBFs) that encode the required axioms.
First, we extend the language L (respectively, L ± ) with universal and existential quantifiers ∀, ∃ over propositional variables. Denote the extended language by L Q (respectively, L ± Q ). The elements of L Q are called quantified Boolean formulae (QBFs), and the elements of L ± Q are called signed QBFs. QBFs and signed QBFs are denoted here by the Greek letters , , and sets of (signed) QBFs are denoted by . Intuitively, the meaning of a QBF of the form ∃ p ∀q ψ is that there exists a truth assignment of p such that for every truth assignment of q, ψ is true. Clearly, every QBF is associated with a logically equivalent propositional formula, thus QBFs can be seen as a conservative extension of classical propositional logic. Next we formalize this intuition.
Consider a QBF over L Q . An occurrence of an atom p in is called free if it is not in the scope of a quantifier Q p, for Q ∈ {∀, ∃}. Denote by [φ 1 / p 1 , . . . , φ n / p n ] the uniform substitution of each free occurrence of a variable (atom) p i in by a formula φ i , for i = 1, . . . , n. Now, the definition of a valuation can be extended to QBFs as follows:
As usual, we say that a (two-valued) valuation ν satisfies a QBF if ν( ) = 1, ν is a model of a set of QBFs (denoted ν ∈ mod( )) if ν satisfies every element of , and a QBF is (classically) entailed by (denotated |= 2 ) if every model of is also a model of . 
Preferential Reasoning by Signed QBFs
We are now ready to use signed QBFs for representing preferential reasoning. In what follows, T denotes a finite set of formulae in L, and T ∧ denotes the conjunction of the elements in T .
PROPOSITION 5.9. Let = {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ k } and T be finite sets of formulae in L, and let
2 that is associated with ν 4 is a model of τ 1 (T ) and the following signed QBF, denoted Min(≤ ϒ , T ),
PROOF. By Proposition 3.9-(2), ν 4 is a model of T iff ν 2 is a model of τ 1 (T ). It remains to show, then, that the fact that ν 2 satisfies Min(≤ ϒ , T ) is a necessary and sufficient condition for assuring that ν 4 is ≤ ϒ -minimal among the models of T . For this, denote by ({r 1 , . . . , r n } : μ 1 , {s 1 , . . . , s m } : μ 2 ) a valuation that interprets the symbols in {r 1 , . . . , r n } according to μ 1 and the symbols in {s 1 , . . . , s m } according to μ 2 . Now, suppose that μ Note 5.10. As the QBF Min(≤ ϒ , T ) of the last proposition expresses minimization, it is clearly related to the notion of circumscription [McCarthy 1980] , in which second-order formulae are usually used for expressing minimization. Indeed, an alternative way of regarding QBFs is as a particular class of secondorder languages where predicates are restricted to arity 0. We refer to Section 7, and in particular to Corollary 7.4, where we compare our approach to related works that use circumscription as the primary methods for encoding (multivalued and preferential) entailments.
Proposition 5.9 immediately implies the following theorem and corollary, applied to finite sets T , of formulae in L. Example 5.14. By Theorem 5.11, it is now possible to simulate the consequence relations of Example 5.5 by classical entailment. Indeed, if T , are finite sets of formulae in L, then
T |= P ψ where P = (|= 4 , ≤ { ,t} ) iff τ 1 (T ), Min(≤ { ,t} , T ) |= 2 τ 1 (ψ).
Complexity
The representation theorems by signed formulae (Theorems 4.1 and 5.11) allow, in particular, to derive complexity results for the corresponding consequence relations. For instance, Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.5 show that the entailment problems for |= 4 , |= 3 KL , and |= 3 LP can be reduced (using a polynomial-time transformation) to the problem of entailment in classical logic, which implies that the corresponding decision problems are in coNP (moreover, this fact, together with polynomial-time reductions from SAT, show the well-known result that these problems are actually coNP-complete; see, e.g., Cadoli and Schaerf [1996] , Costa-Marquis and Marquis [2002] , and Konieczny and Marquis [2002] ).
By Theorem 5.11 one can derive complexity results for the preferential versions of the aforementioned consequence relations (see also Costa-Marquis and Marquis [2004, 2002] and Konieczny and Marquis [2002] for related results about the computational complexity of some of these relations). 
true (where Q = ∀ if i is odd and Q = ∃ if i is even) is P i -complete.
For the three-valued case, note that T has to be extended with the set EM(T ) or EFQ(T ) that forces three-valued assignments, but this does not change the complexity of the corresponding decision problems.
Note that under the usual assumptions of complexity theory, the complexity bound specified in the last corollary is not strict for every consequence relation of the form |= It follows, then, that the evaluation of the resulting QBFs for the consequence relations considered previously resides in the same complexity class as the decision of the original problems! 6. GENERALIZATIONS
Reasoning with Graded Abnormality
The consequence relation |= 4 (ϒ, ) of Definition 5.4 can be generalized in several ways to capture other consequence relations considered in the literature. In this section we demonstrate one possible extension and show how to simulate, by signed QBFs and classical entailment, preferential reasoning with different levels of uncertainty.
Definition 6.1. A partial order ≺ on a set S is called modular if y ≺ x 2 for every x 1 , x 2 , y ∈ S such that x 1 ≺ x 2 , x 2 ≺ x 1 , and y ≺ x 1 . Modular orders will be used here for grading uncertainty. As shown in Lehmann and Magidor [1992] , ≺ is a modular order on S iff there is a total order < on a set S and a function g : S → S such that x 1 ≺ x 2 iff g (x 1 ) < g (x 2 ). For a modular order ≺ on FOUR then, there is a partition ϒ 1 . . . ϒ m of FOUR such that x ≺ y iff x ∈ ϒ i , y ∈ ϒ j , and 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m.
Let T and be sets of formulae in L. Let ≺ be a modular order on FOUR and ν, μ ∈ mod(T ). Denote ν ≺ μ, if there is a ψ ∈ such that ν(ψ) ≺ μ(ψ) and for every φ ∈ , either ν(φ) ≺ μ(φ), or ν(φ) and μ(φ) are ≺-incomparable.
A valuation ν ∈ mod(T ) is a ≺ -minimal model of T if there is no μ ∈ mod(T ) such that μ ≺ ν. Denote T |= , introduced in Arieli [2003] , is one example of formalisms for reasoning with graded uncertainty. In this case consists of the atomic formulae, and the preferred (i.e., the ≺ -minimal) models are determined according to a modular order ≺ c 3 on FOUR that has three "uncertainty levels." t, f are the ≺ c 3 -minimal elements, ⊥ is the ≺ c 3 -intermediate value, and is the ≺ c 3 -maximal (i.e., the most abnormal) one. Clearly then, |= 
This theory has three ≺ c 3 -minimal models: ν 1 = {p : ⊥, q : f }, ν 2 = {p : t, q : }, and ν 3 = {p : f , q : }. Therefore, for example, T |= In order to simulate consequence relations such as |= 4 c 3 in our framework, it is necessary to extend Definition 5.1. In particular, ϒ should be partitioned according to the underlying preference order. 
Preferential reasoning with graded uncertainty can now be defined in our context as follows.
The following proposition follows from the fact that that are not the same as any consequence relation of the form |= 4 (ϒ, ) . The consequence relation of Examples 6.2 and 6.6 is one example of this (in Arieli [2003] , it is shown that this consequence relation is different than any other four-valued consequence relation that is defined by a pointwisepreferential order on FOUR). It follows, therefore, that consequence relations of the form |= have more than two levels of uncertainty. The next step is to simulate reasoning with graded uncertainty by (signed) QBFs. For this, ≤ ϒ -minimal valuations should be described by an appropriate signed QBF. In the remainder of this section, for the sake of keeping this QBF as simple as possible, we consider only the case where = A(T ). However, similar results can be obtained for any finite set of formulae in L (as in Proposition 5.9).
PROPOSITION 6.8. Let T be a finite set of formulae in L, and let
A ± (T ) = { p 1 , . . . , p n }. Then ν 4 is a ≤ A(T ) ϒ -minimal model of T , where ϒ = {ϒ 1 , ϒ 2 , . . . , ϒ m } is a
partition of FOUR, iff the two-valued valuation ν 2 that is associated with ν 4 is a model of τ 1 (T ) and the following signed QBF, denoted Min(≤
PROOF. Again, we denote by ({r 1 , . . . , r n } : μ 1 , {s 1 , . . . , s m } : μ 2 ) a valuation that interprets the symbols in {r 1 , . . . , r n } according to μ 1 and the symbols in {s 1 , . . . , s m } according to μ 2 . Now, the proof is similar to that of Proposition 5.9, using the fact that μ 
where μ 
PROOF. By propositions 6.5 and 6.9.
The last results imply that the decision problem for consequence relations with graded abnormality remains in the second level of the polynomial hierarchy (compare with Proposition 5.15).
PROPOSITION 6.11. The decision problem for |=
PROOF. Similar to that of Proposition 5.15, using Proposition 6.9.
Again, as noted in Section 5.4, P 2 is not a strict bound for every decision problem of entailments of the form |=
is equivalent to |= 4 , the decision problem of which is in P 1 ). However, as noted in the paragraph following the proof of Proposition 5.15, many decision problems for consequence relations of the form |= 4 (ϒ,A(T )) (which are by Proposition 6.7 also of the form |=
( ϒ,A(T ))
) are hard for Other generalizations of Definition 5.1 could be useful as well. For instance, the set may contain formulae with different levels of abnormality, in which case it should be graded. Again, it is possible to simulate reasoning with corresponding consequence relations by signed QBFs, just as described before for cases in which ϒ is graded.
Beyond Four-Valued Semantics
In this section we show that by using the same techniques as those introduced earlier, it is possible to perform preferential reasoning in general multiplevalued logics (having arbitrarily many truth values). For instance, default reasoning in the context of nine-valued semantics [Arieli and Avron 1996 ] (see Figure 2 ) may be simulated though either Kleene's three-valued logic [Kleene 1950 ] or Priest's three-valued logic LP [Priest 1991 [Priest , 1989 ] (see Example 6.22 to follow). Essentially, we do so by repeating the same process as described before, using signed formulae for the basic entailment, and quantified Boolean formulae for expressing the preferential semantics. Next are the details.
13 Let D L be the set of designated elements of L. As usual in multiple-valued logics (and as we did in the case of FOUR), we require that D L be a filter in L, namely, it is a nonempty proper subset of L such that for
13 In other words, for every x, y ∈ L, x ≤ L y iff ¬ y ≤ L ¬x, and for every x ∈ L, ¬¬x = x.
• O. Arieli
Fig. 2. T HREE T HREE.
Now, the connectives of the language L are defined by the corresponding operators on L: conjunction, disjunction, and negation correspond, respectively, to the meet, join, and negation operators on L; the definition of the implication connective ⊃ depends, as in the case of FOUR, on the choice of designated elements:
The other semantical notions and corresponding consequence relations are now defined in the obvious way: -A (multiple-valued) valuation ν is a function that assigns an element of L to each atomic formula in . A valuation is extended to complex formulae in the standard way:
-A valuation ν is a model of T if it satisfies every formula in T . We shall continue to denote by mod(T ) the set of the models of T .
A natural definition for a consequence relation with respect to this L-valued semantics is the following. Definition 6.13. Let L be a lattice and D L a prime filter in it. For a set T of formulae and a formula ψ,
Common examples of logics that are obtained from the preceding definitions are classical logic where L is the two-valued lattice ({t, f }, f < L t) and D L ={t}, Kleene's three-valued logic [Kleene 1950 ], where L is the three-valued lattice
and D L = {t}, Priest's three-valued logic [Priest 1989 ], where L is the three-valued lattice ({t, f , }, f ≤ L ≤ L t) and D L = {t, }, and Belnap's four-valued logic [Belnap 1977b ] defined in Section 2. Note that the former two logics are not paraconsistent while the latter two are.
6.2.2
The Bilattice-Valued Setting. In previous sections we have reduced four-valued paraconsistent reasoning to classical entailment by "splitting" syntactical and semantical objects (e.g., the alphabet, truth values, and truth assignments) to their positive and negative counterparts. The same idea can be applied here, this time in the L-valued setting. This leads us to the following construct.
Definition 6.14 [Ginsberg 1988] 
consists of pairs of elements from L that are arranged in two complete lattice structures as follows:
The unary operation ¬ is defined on L×L by ¬(x, y) = ( y, x).
Figures 1 and 2 show two structures that are particular cases of Definition 6.14 where L is a chain of two and three elements, respectively. The structure that L L forms is called a bilattice [Fitting 1990; Ginsberg 1988] , denoting that the set of truth values is simultaneously arranged in two (related) lattice structures. As in the four-valued case, a truth value (x, y) ∈ L L may intuitively be understood so that x represents the amount of evidence for an assertion, while y represents the amount of evidence against it. It is easy to verify that the basic ≤ t -operators are defined in the same way as in FOUR, namely, that for every
Clearly, the structure of Definition 6.14 is a natural extension of Belnap's four-valued structure. As before, we denote by
Given a bilattice L L and a (prime) filter D L L of it, one may define a corresponding consequence relation in a way similar to the lattice-valued case. 14 It worth noting that the ≤ k -join ⊕ and the ≤ k -meet ⊗ in L L have similar definitions. For every x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ∈ L, (x 1 , y 1 ) ⊕ (x 2 , y 2 ) = (x 1 ∨ x 2 , y 1 ∨ y 2 ) and (x 1 , y 1 ) ⊗ (x 2 , y 2 ) = (x 1 ∧ x 2 , y 1 ∧ y 2 ). These operators, nevertheless, will not play an important role in what follows. 
Example 6.17. Consider again T 1 of Example 5.3 and the bilattice T HREE T HREE (Figure 2 ) with D T HREE T HREE = {(x, y) | (x, y) ≥ k (1, 0)}. Suppose that one wants to consider only those models of T 1 that are "as consistent as possible" (i.e., the models of T 1 that assign either true (1, 0) or false (0, 1) to a maximal amount of atomic formulae that appear in the premise formulae). In this case, ϒ = T HREE × T HREE − {(1, 0), (0, 1)} and = A(T 1 ). Now, abbreviate by 9 the pair (T HREE T HREE, D T HREE T HREE ). Then, for instance, 
We again start with the basic consequence relations of these settings and then turn to the preferential cases.
PROOF (OUTLINE). Essentially, we repeat the process described in Section 3, and extend the corresponding results to the (bi)lattice-valued case.
As in Definition 3.1, we define a signed alphabet ± for a given alphabet .
are associated with each other, exactly like the two-and four-valued case (see again Definition 3.1). By induction on the structure of the formulae in the language L, one can show that if ν L is induced by ν L×L or ν L×L is induced by ν L , then for every formula ψ,
where the τ i transformations (i = 1, 2) are the same as those of Definition 3.2 (see the proof of Proposition 3.4). By the last equations then,
which means that ν L×L satisfies ψ iff ν L satisfies τ 1 (ψ), and ν L×L satisfies ¬ψ iff ν L satisfies τ 2 (ψ) (compare with Corollary 3.6). It follows that there is a oneto-one correspondence between the L×L-valued models of T (with respect to D) and the L-valued models of τ 1 (T ) (with respect to D L ), and so we are done.
We turn now to the preferential case. Again, paraconsistent preferential reasoning in L L may be simulated in L by signed QBFs in a way which is similar to the one described in Section 5.3. The only difference is that unlike the fourvalued case, it is not possible to represent every element in L×L by a formula in L (i.e., it is not necessarily possible to define formulae val, like those of Definition 3.7, that satisfy the property of Proposition 3.8), so it is not always possible to define formulae ϒ(ψ) that hold iff the truth value of ψ is in ϒ (see Note 5.7). We therefore have to impose the following restriction on the choice of ϒ.
Definition 6.20. Given a bilattice L L and filter F in L×L, consider the following partition of L×L:
Consider again the signed QBF Min(≤ ϒ , T ) introduced in Proposition 5.9 for a theory T and fixed sets , ϒ. The analog of Theorem 5.11 is now the following. 
PROOF (OUTLINE). In the proof of Theorem 6.19 we have shown that if ν L is induced by ν L×L or ν L×L is induced by ν L , then for every formula ψ, ν L×L satisfies ψ iff ν L satisfies τ 1 (ψ), and ν L×L satisfies ¬ψ iff ν L satisfies τ 2 (ψ). In the notations of Definition 3.7 then, for every formulae ψ and every c ∈ {t, f , , ⊥}, ν L×L (ψ) ∈ T c iff ν L satisfies val(ψ, c) (the proof of this is similar to that of Proposition 3.8, using the fact that D L is a filter in L). Now, ϒ is a nonempty perceptive subset of L × L, so there are elements c 1 ,
is a model of τ 1 (T ) and Min(≤ ϒ , T ) (the proof of this is completely analogous to that of Proposition 5.9, using the fact that we have shown that for a perceptive set ϒ, Proposition 3.9- (2) and Note 5.7 are both valid in the L×L-case as well).
Example 6.22. Consider again the bilattice T HREE T HREE of Figure 2 . This structure may be used, for example, for default reasoning (where the values ( 1 2 , 0) and (0, 1 2 ) stand for "true by default" and "false by default," respectively, see e.g., Avron [1998, 1996] ). This structure has two sets that are 15 Here we are using the fact that D L is a prime filter in L.
• O. Arieli prime filters with respect to both ≤ t and ≤ k , namely,
, 0)}. These sets are therefore natural candidates for being the set of the designated elements. Note moreover, that D 1 = {1}×{0, } (a setting that corresponds to Priest's three-valued logic LP).
RELATED WORKS
A key issue in our approach is the encoding of many-valued logics in terms of two-valued classical logic by means of signed formulae. Such formulae were introduced by Schaub [1998, 1996] as syntax-independent paraconsistent reasoning systems. A similar idea is used in Denecker [2003, 2002] , and Besnard et al. [2003] , where different transformations of formulae to signed formulae are considered for reducing multiple-valued entailments to classical entailments. We find the τ -transformations used here (Definition 3.2) somewhat more natural and general for conversions to signed theories, as threevalued semantics is inherent in the formalism of Besnard et al. [2003] (this is implied by Definition 1 in that paper), and the language considered in Denecker [2003, 2002] is not functionally complete.
The use of QBF axiomatic theories for representing preferred models is another fundamental ingredient of our approach. Using QBFs for knowledge representation and reasoning is proposed by Egly et al. [2000] , who showed that several major problems from propositional nonmonotonic reasoning can be translated into QBFs and resolved by the QBF-based system QUIP. Quantified propositional logic for paraconsistent reasoning has been independently considered in the preliminary version of this article [Arieli 2004 ] and by Besnard et al., who defined a variety of paraconsistent consequence relations by means of default logic [Besnard et al. 2002] and showed how to circumscribe inconsistent theories in the context of three-valued logics [Besnard et al. 2003 ] (see also Besnard et al. [2004] for a survey on these and related methods). Although the QBF axiomatic theories in Besnard et al. [2003] are different than ours, in both cases the formulae are obtained from the original theories by an effective and efficient (polynomial-time constructible) encoding. Moreover, when the complexity bounds given in Propositions 5.15 and 6.11 for the underlying consequence relations are strict, determining the validity of the QBFs resulting from the transformations is not computationally harder than checking inferences with respect to those consequence relations. 16 The main difference between the approach in this article and that of Besnard et al. [2003] concerns the representation level. Whereas the encoding used by Besnard et al. [2003] is sensitive to the underlying three-valued semantic and the interrelations among its elements, here the role of truth values 16 For instances of those relations that have lower complexity than P 2 , efficient reductions to classical logic are more appropriate; see, for example, Denecker [2003, 2002] . is somewhat more transparent. As a consequence, our formalism can be generalized relatively easily, as can be verified by comparing the computation of the basic four-valued entailment (Theorem 4.1) to that of lattice-valued entailment (Theorem 6.19), or by relating the simulation of preferential entailments (Theorem 5.11) to the reasoning process with their graded extensions (Proposition 6.9). Similar generalizations are less natural in the case of the formalism of Besnard et al. [2003] . For instance, switching from the axiomatization of Priest's three-valued logic |= 3 LP (which is the basic three-valued entailment considered in Besnard et al. [2003] ) to that of Kleene's three-valued logic |= 3 Kl requires, according to the approach of Besnard et al. [2003] , a modification in the parametrized translation to signed formulae, while in our case the same transformation is appropriate for both logics (Corollary 4.5), as well as for their generalizations to logics with more truth values and/or with preferential semantics. Now, as the consequence relations considered in Besnard et al. [2003] are particular cases of those conveyed by Definition 5.4, our formalism may be viewed as an alternative approach for simulating the three-valued consequence relations considered in Besnard et al. [2003] which is tolerant to refinements of the preference criteria at hand, and offers a simple way of generalizing the underlying semantics to algebraic structures with arbitrarily many truth values.
Another approach for reducing (multiple-valued) preferential reasoning to (higher-order) classical propositional logic is considered in Arieli and Denecker [2003] . This approach expresses preferences in terms of second-order formulae, so (instead of QBF solvers) algorithms for processing circumscriptive theories (i.e., reducing second-order formulae to their first-order equivalents) are needed in order to implement preferential reasoning. In the propositional case, a circumscriptive encoding is given in Egly et al. [2000] (see also Lifschitz [1985] ). As both methods have the same origin (i.e., second-order languages; see Note 5.10), this duality is quite natural. Next we formulate the exact relation between the present approach and the circumscription-based approach of Arieli and Denecker [2003] with respect to the propositional fragment of L (i.e., the language without "⊃").
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Define the scope of a negation operator ¬ in the formula ¬ψ as the set of all occurrences of propositional symbols in ψ. An occurrence of p in a formula ψ is positive if it appears in the scope of an even number of negation operators in ψ, otherwise it is a negative occurrence.
Definition 7.1 [Arieli and Denecker 2003] . Let ψ be a formula in . Denote by ψ the formula in ± , obtained from ψ by substituting every positive occurrence in ψ of an atomic formula p by p + and replacing every negative occurrence in ψ of an atomic formula p by ¬ p − . Given a theory T , the set {ψ | ψ ∈ T } is denoted by T .
Example 7.2. Consider again the formula ψ = ¬( p ∨ ¬q) ∨ ¬q of Example 3.3. The first occurrence of q in ψ is positive, and the second occurrence of q as well as the (single) occurrence of p in ψ are negative. Thus, the signed
formula that is obtained from ψ is ψ = ¬(¬ p − ∨ ¬q + ) ∨ ¬¬q − . Note that ψ is logically equivalent to τ 1 (ψ) (see Example 3.3). As the following proposition shows, this equivalence is not accidental. PROPOSITION 7.3. If ν 4 (ψ) = x and ν 2 is the two-valued valuation that is induced by ν 4 , then ν 2 (ψ) = 1 iff ν 2 (τ 1 (ψ)) = 1 (iff x ≥ k t).
PROOF. Let ν 4 (ψ) = (ν 1 (ψ), ν 2 (ψ)) and let ν 2 be the two-valued valuation that is induced by ν 4 . In Arieli and Denecker [2003, Prop. 2.4] it is shown that ν 2 (ψ) = ν 1 (ψ). The claim now follows from item (2) (1) The two-valued models of T are the same as the two-valued models of τ 1 (T ); (2) T |= 4 ψ iff T |= 2 ψ (iff τ 1 (T ) |= 2 τ 1 (ψ)); and
incorporation of new solving paradigms based on symbolic reasoning strategies [Benedetti 2005 ]. Different methods for converting formulae to prenex CNF and specifying them in Dimacs or Rintanen format (which is the conventional form that QBF solvers accept) also help to reduce the evaluation time of different solvers (see Egly et al. [2004] ). Moreover, QBF solvers provide an easy way of obtaining a prototypical implementation for many different problems, and this kind of implementation is particularly suitable for our purpose, since quantified Boolean formulae offer a natural way of expressing minimization (which is in many cases a major consideration in preferential reasoning). We believe, therefore, that QBF solvers are becoming powerful mechanisms that provide robust ways of computing preferential entailments in general, and paraconsistent reasoning in particular.
